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5. Apple’s iPad City: subcontracting
exploitation to China
Jenny Chan, Pun Ngai and Mark Selden
INTRODUCTION1
Many image- conscious technology companies, probably none more than 
Apple in our digital age, have professed ideals of corporate citizenship, 
environmental, labour and social responsibility in their supplier codes of 
conduct. This is in part a response to the growing anti- sweatshop move-
ment in the electronics industry from within the United States, Europe, 
and more recently Greater China (Smith et al. 2006; Litzinger 2013). 
Violations of factory workers’ fundamental rights in export- oriented 
industry nevertheless remain intractable, prompting scholars and practi-
tioners in corporate responsibility to promote the leverage of private and 
public power to create ‘just supply chains’ (Locke 2013; Mayer and Gereffi 
2010; Boston Review 2013). The main effort of public–private partnerships 
is to call on a shared commitment of the national governments, transna-
tional corporations, and non- governmental labour organizations to better 
protect workers.
This chapter assesses the direct impact of Apple’s outsourcing practices 
on manufacturing workers’ conditions in China. We focus on workers’ 
lives at the world’s largest supplier of Apple products, Taiwanese- owned 
Foxconn Technology Group (hereafter Foxconn), which are shaped by 
both state policies and global capital played out inside the factory. The 
consolidation of high- tech electronics production in China and elsewhere 
potentially strengthens state regulation or ‘public governance’ of trans-
national firms (Mayer and Gereffi 2010: 15–17). In our close study of the 
Apple–Foxconn relationship in China, however, we have not observed 
the ‘positive role’ of the Chinese government ‘in promoting collabora-
tive buyer–supplier relations’ (Locke 2013: 19), even when international 
capital is concentrated at the national, local and firm levels. Instead, 
1 The authors wish to thank Debby Chan, Jeffery Hermanson, Pauline Overeem, 
Scott Nova, Isaac Shapiro, Michael Burawoy, Peter Evans, Richard Appelbaum, 
Nelson Lichtenstein, Jeroen Merk, SACOM (Students and Scholars Against Corporate 
Misbehaviour), and the University Research Group for their support.
Apple’s iPad City   77
workers face foreign giants such as Apple and Foxconn that enjoy the full 
backing of the local state. We document for China the ways in which the 
integration of the electronics manufacturing industry in a global division 
of labour has intensified labour conflicts and class antagonism.
Foxconn has risen to become the largest employer of industrial workers, 
with 1.4 million employees in China alone. Between 2010 and 2014, we 
collaborated with an independent University Research Group to carry 
out fieldwork on Foxconn’s labour practices and production systems in 
twelve major Chinese cities, where Foxconn runs giant manufacturing 
sites and research and development centres (Pun et al. 2014). Foxconn 
has more than 30 factories across China; the surveyed factories are based 
in eastern, central and western China, from Shenzhen in Guangdong, 
Chongqing, Shanghai, Tianjin, Beijing and others, to the ‘iPad City’ in 
Chengdu (Sichuan). Because Apple is the world’s most profitable electron-
ics company, Foxconn the largest employer of workers, Apple its largest 
client, and China the largest producer and exporter of electronic goods, 
this study concentrates on the seminal Apple–Foxconn relationship in 
order to chart its consequences for labour.
With government officials prioritizing economic development rather 
than advancing labour and human rights, we highlight a range of abuses 
resulting in a wave of suicides among Foxconn workers in 2010 and a 
deadly industrial explosion at one of the new Foxconn factory complexes 
in May 2011, as well as continuing worker abuses including illegal over-
time and forced student labour to the present. External monitoring of 
Foxconn conditions by the Fair Labour Association, we show, provided 
public relations cover for Apple and other firms that pay for its surveys, 
but failed to curb flagrant corporate abuses or strengthen workers’ 
rights.
The next section reviews the changing geography of manufacturing 
and the growth of Asian electronics contractors in global outsourcing. It 
follows with an account of Foxconn’s high- speed expansion across China. 
We enter the iPad city where workers producing this signature Apple 
product are struggling for fundamental rights to a work–life balance, 
decent wages, and a safe and healthy working environment. As produc-
tion requirements tighten under intense market competition, and the speed 
of the line relentlessly increases, labour crises have also intensified. The 
 conclusion sheds light on the social movement forces for justice.
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LABOUR, OUTSOURCING, AND THE RISE OF 
ASIAN ELECTRONICS CONTRACTORS
Capital concentration and consolidation are inherent to capitalism. As 
Karl Marx wrote in Capital (1990: 929), ‘one capitalist always strikes 
down many others’. Corporations exploit spaces of uneven development 
at home and abroad to maximize profit. Capital transforms favoured 
rural and urban sites for industrialization, while excluding ‘other regions 
of the globe’ from ‘new waves of economic transformation’ (Webster et al. 
2008: 1). From the 1980s, with the demise of central planning in the Soviet 
Union, central and eastern Europe and China, and the promotion of ‘free 
trade’ in other emergent economies, the global structure of industrial 
production has fundamentally shifted. Through corporate outsourcing, 
restructuring, mergers and acquisitions, large companies expand market 
share at home and abroad. Leading firms such as Apple and IBM, known 
as the ‘chain drivers’ or ‘market makers’, once produced many of their 
products in- house in their own countries. In recent decades they have 
preferred to set up hierarchically structured networks of independently- 
owned suppliers to produce their commodities (Hopkins and Wallerstein 
1986; Gereffi 1994; McKay 2006). Offshore mass production increased 
by leaps and bounds. By 2000, 50 per cent of global manufacturing pro-
duction was in developing countries with production organized through 
global supply chains, and the trend accelerated thereafter (quoted in 
Mayer and Gereffi 2010: 3).
Transnational giants seek to partner with a small number of highly 
efficient and strategically located contractors, while diversifying risks 
and minimizing costs through supply chain management. ‘Global supply 
bases’ have emerged in India, Brazil, Mexico, South Africa, Vietnam, 
and other rapidly developing economies, but above all in China, where 
production activities and market transactions are taking place at competi-
tively low price, high speed, and in huge volumes (Sturgeon et al. 2011; 
Bonacich and Hamilton 2011; Henderson and Nadvi 2011).
Large contract manufacturers have been upgrading and growing in 
size and scale. Richard Appelbaum (2008) finds that East Asian contrac-
tors, ranging from footwear and garments to electronics, have been inte-
grating vertically in their supply chains. Joonkoo Lee and Gary Gereffi 
(2013) explain the co- evolution process that capital accumulation of 
smartphone leaders have advanced alongside the innovation within their 
large assemblers. Electronics manufacturers provide value- added services, 
component- processing, and final- assembly in ‘one- stop shopping’ to tech-
nology firms such as Apple (Dedrick and Kraemer 2011) and retail giants.
Giant manufacturers, rather than small workshops, are better able to 
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‘respond to shortening product cycles and increasing product complex-
ity’ (Starosta 2010: 546), thus becoming powerful players in just- in- time 
production networks. They serve multiple clients to climb the global value 
chains. Not only production tasks, but also inventory management and 
logistics, are being concentrated in strategic factories, resulting in ever 
stronger mutually dependent relations between buyers and suppliers.
Boy Lüthje (2006: 17–18) observes that in recent decades brand- name 
firms have focused on ‘product development, design, and marketing’, 
gaining a larger share of the value created in trade even as they abandon 
hardware manufacturing. Subject to strong demands from global brands, 
manufacturers and electronics service providers in China and other coun-
tries compete against each other to meet production speed, pricing, and 
quality goals, shaving profit margins (Ross 2006).
As we show in the case of Apple and Foxconn, it is Apple that domi-
nates the relationship and imposes its will on its contractors. Given its 
considerable market share, Apple dictates price- setting and the timing 
of product delivery, at times resulting in intense pressures for Foxconn 
and other workers, and above all, health and safety hazards (Chan and 
Pun 2010; Pun and Chan 2012; 2013; Chan 2013; Chan et al. 2013). At 
the industry level, facing strong competition, Apple seeks to lower costs, 
strengthen control over suppliers, and speed up to release newer prod-
ucts. The buyer- driven pattern is characteristic of numerous American, 
European, Japanese and South Korean transnationals that dominate the 
electronics industry (Lüthje et al. 2013).
Searching for cheaper, disciplined and more pliant labour, global 
buyers – in Western and Asian countries alike – have exported capital 
(thereby circumventing tighter labour regulatory systems within certain 
nations). The resulting ‘successive geographical relocation of capital’ 
has been facilitated by efficient transportation and communications 
technologies, regional and international financial services, and access to 
immigrants and surplus labour (Silver 2003: 39; Harvey 2010; Harrison 
1997). The ‘race to the bottom’, however, has rarely proceeded without 
labour, social and/or environmental challenges at sites of new investment 
(Cowie 2001; Silver 2003; Chen 2011; Jang and Gray, this volume). China, 
in its opening to foreign capital and international trade since the early 
1980s, well exemplifies all these processes – and in an extreme form, where 
hundreds of millions of workers are being drawn into global production 
chains. Some aggrieved workers have taken aim at reputation- conscious 
large companies to defend their rights and interests. The question remains 
whether, and under what conditions, workers can effectively challenge 
the combination of corporate and state power to raise labour and social 
standards.
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THE FOXCONN EMPIRE
Foxconn – the name alludes to the corporation’s ability to produce elec-
tronic connectors at nimble ‘fox- like’ speed – supplies components and fin-
ished products not only for Apple, but also for IBM, Microsoft, Google, 
Intel, Cisco, GE, Amazon, HP, Dell, Motorola, Nokia, Panasonic, Sony, 
Toshiba, Fujitsu, Nintendo, Samsung, LG, Sony Ericsson, Acer, Huawei 
and Lenovo, a Who’s Who of global electronic producers including two 
of China’s own leading tech companies. Its parent corporation, Hon Hai 
Precision Industry Company, was founded in Taipei in 1974. In these 
four decades, Foxconn has successfully integrated production processes 
from raw material extraction to component manufacture to final assembly 
(Foxconn Technology Group 2009: 10). In July 2013, Fortune Global 500 
ranked Foxconn 30th on the list, up 13 places from the previous year, with 
annual revenues of US$132 billion, far higher than most of its corporate 
customers, with the notable exception of Apple (which had US$156.5 
billion in sales).
In outsourced production, Foxconn competes on ‘speed, quality, engi-
neering service, efficiency, and added value’ to maximize profits (Foxconn 
Technology Group 2009: 8). In the 1990s, Apple, Lucent, Nortel, Alcatel 
and Ericsson ‘sold off most, if not all, of their in- house manufacturing 
capacity – both at home and abroad – to a cadre of large and highly capable 
US- based contract manufacturers, including Solectron, Flextronics, Jabil 
Circuit, Celestica, and Sanmina- SCI’ (Sturgeon et al. 2011: 236). In 
2002, Apple contracted Foxconn to assemble Macs, and established the 
long- term business relationships that continue to the present (Interview, 
7 March 2011). Since 2004 Foxconn has led the electronics manufacturing 
sector in market share, surpassing long- time rival Flextronics to become 
the world leader (Pick 2006).
Currently Foxconn captures more than 50 per cent of the world market 
share in electronics manufacturing and service (Dinges 2010). Under the 
leadership of founder Terry Gou, Foxconn has ridden the waves of succes-
sive revolutions in information and communications technology to vastly 
expand its ’6C’ product lines. Their products are computers (desktops, 
laptops and tablets), communications equipment (mobile phones and 
smartphones), consumer digital (music players, cameras, game consoles 
and TVs), cars (automotive electronics), content (e- book readers) and 
health- care products. In all of these, Foxconn has achieved state of the art 
technologies while simplifying production processes to reduce workers to 
repetition of simple motions throughout ten to twelve- hour days.
Industry analysts note that ‘manufacturing operations in China 
were responsible for more than 75 per cent of aggregate [electronics 
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 manufacturing services] industry growth in 2010 [US$347 billion], and the 
country is expected to continue carrying the burden of driving worldwide 
growth’ (Dinges 2011). Foxconn boasts that ‘China is not the only one 
globalizing’ (Bloomberg Businessweek 2010). The sprawling industrial 
empire has more than 200 subsidiaries around the globe,2 but the overseas 
Foxconn operations are dwarfed by the mega factories in China. Working 
outside of China enables Foxconn’s customers to get quicker turnaround 
on orders, reduce labour and transportation costs, and avoid some import 
taxes (Andrijasevic and Sacchetto 2013). Nevertheless, the enterprise’s 
most extensive operations by far are in China.
Facing fierce competition, Foxconn strives to tighten labour processes, 
control costs, and expand engineering and manufacturing technologies to 
maintain its position as ‘the most trusted name in contract manufacturing 
services’ (Interview, 25 October 2010). It recruits mostly teens and young 
adults to run the assembly lines. ‘Over 85 per cent of Foxconn’s employees 
are rural migrant workers between 16 and 29 years old’, a Chinese human 
resources manager said (Interview, 14 October 2011). Foxconn in this 
respect is emblematic of the national pattern. Official data in 2009 showed 
that of all rural migrants, 42 per cent were between 16 and 25 years old and 
another 20 per cent were between 26 and 30 (China’s National Bureau of 
Statistics 2010).
From the 1980s, rural migrants have moved from constituting a 
marginal part of the Chinese industrial labour force to dominating it in 
numerical terms, reversing the situation prior to market reform in which 
their movement had been severely limited by state restrictions on rural- 
to- urban migration. They are the mainstay of the new urban industrial 
labour. In Shenzhen, the rapidly growing city just across the border from 
Hong Kong in southern coastal China, Foxconn’s more than 500 000 
employees (Foxconn Technology Group 2010a; 2010b) were churning 
out a wide array of electronic devices, day and night. It was here that in 
the first five months of 2010, at least 12 ‘jumps’ – attempted and com-
pleted suicides of Foxconn workers who leaped from high- rise factory 
 dormitories – were reported by local and international media.
The Foxconn ‘campus’, as the managers like to call it, organizes pro-
duction and daily labour reproduction activities in a self- contained envi-
ronment. The Longhua complex of 1.75 million square metres – larger 
2 Foxconn has worldwide production facilities in Taiwan, China, Japan, South Korea, 
Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, Vietnam, India, United Arab 
Emirates, Russia, Finland, Sweden, Denmark, Germany, Czech Republic, Slovakia, 
Hungary, the Netherlands, Austria, Turkey, Ireland, Scotland, Brazil, Canada, Mexico, and 
the United States.
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than the entire new ‘University City’ in Shenzhen – includes factories, 
warehouses, dormitories, banks, two hospitals, a post office, a fire 
brigade with two fire engines, an exclusive television network, an educa-
tional institute, a library, soccer fields, basketball courts, tennis courts, 
track and field, swimming pools, cyber theatres, shops, supermarkets, 
cafeterias and restaurants, an employee care and support service centre, 
and even a wedding dress shop. The complex is equipped with advanced 
production facilities since it is the model factory for customers, central- 
and local- level governments, and visitors from media organizations and 
other inspection units.
Foxconn has manufacturing complexes not only in Shenzhen and 
all four major Chinese municipalities of Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin and 
Chongqing, but also in fifteen provinces throughout the country (see 
Figure 5.1). Below we look beyond its gleaming facilities to the daily lives 
of its workers.
Foxconn is building a production network in which vertical integration, 
flexible coordination across different facilities and 24- hour continuous 
assembly bolster its market competitiveness. Its expansion has been inter-
twined with the Chinese state’s structural reforms since the 1980s, and in 
recent years, the company has kept pace with the Chinese state’s call to 
prioritize inland development in the lagging western region (Hung 2013; 
Selden and Perry 2010). In 1988, Foxconn launched a small processing 
factory in Shenzhen, the first special economic zone opened up to foreign 
trade. In the 1990s, Foxconn diversified its production lines and locations 
in step with Deng Xiaoping’s 1992 call to prioritize the coastal regions to 
spearhead export- oriented development. Major production clusters were 
established in two coastal regions: the Pearl River Delta in the south and 
the Greater Shanghai Delta in the east. In 2001, the company became 
one of China’s leading exporters following the country’s accession to the 
World Trade Organization and further liberalization of international 
trade, and it has maintained and strengthened this position ever since 
(Foxconn Technology Group 2009: 6).
During the global financial crisis in 2008, Chongqing municipal govern-
ment, the only municipality directly under the central government in inland 
China and the gateway to consumer markets in south- western regions, 
launched a Warm Winter stimulus plan to subsidize 1500 businesses 
(Dreyfuss 2009). Going west, Foxconn swiftly set up a computer assem-
bly plant in the Xiyong Microelectronics Industrial Park in Chongqing, 
where the corporate tax rate was slashed from 25 per cent to 15 per cent 
(Interview, 15 March 2011). Despite the contraction of American and 
European demand for consumer electronics, in 2009, Foxconn generated 
a solid NT$1.96 trillion (US$67 billion) in sales (Foxconn Technology 
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Group 2010: 5). Following the economic recovery, the company reported 
a stunning 53 per cent year- on- year increase in revenues to NT$3 trillion 
(US$102.5 billion) in 2010 (Foxconn Technology Group 2011: 4). The 
employee suicides at Foxconn’s China facilities that year, and the subse-
quent pay rise, did not seem to impact on revenues.
‘In twenty years,’ some business executives suggest, just two companies 
will dominate global markets, ‘everything will be made by Foxconn and 
sold by Wal- Mart’ (Balfour and Culpan 2010). A wild exaggeration that 
ignores the central fact of Foxconn’s dependence on Apple and other 
international electronics firms, but the hyperbole is emblematic both of 
the changing character of the world economy and consumption patterns, 
Source: Foxconn.
Figure 5.1 Foxconn’s locations in Greater China
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and of the manufacturing company’s startling rise in scale of employment 
and revenues in China, East Asia and the world.
While Apple’s profit margins are far higher than Foxconn’s (Chan et al. 
2013), as of fiscal year 2013, Foxconn’s revenues reached an unprec-
edented high of US$133.2 billion (Fortune Global 500 2014), thanks to the 
large orders of Apple and other clients. Figure 5.2 shows the increase in 
number of employees and annual revenues of Foxconn since 1996, accord-
ing to the earliest publicly accessible company data, to 2013.
Foxconn’s astonishing expansion across geographic regions was predi-
cated on its ability to secure contracts from Apple and other international 
brands, an outcome facilitated by its ability to forge an alliance with the 
Chinese state at both central and local levels. The company’s access to 
labour, especially young productive workers in low- wage regions, has 
enabled it to achieve economies of scale. Recent Chinese government 
statistics show that the eastern coastal region is still the primary destina-
tion for rural migrant workers nationwide. However, as enterprises build 
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Figure 5.2 Foxconn employees and revenues, 1996–2013
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new factories in regions with lower wages, central and western China 
have narrowed the gap: in 2009 more than 90 million migrants worked in 
the eastern region, around 24 million in the central region, and nearly 30 
million in the western region (China’s National Bureau of Statistics 2010). 
This trend has since continued.
THE APPLE–FOXCONN RELATIONSHIP
Apple leapfrogged Google in 2012, and Samsung in 2013, to become 
‘the world’s most valuable brand’ (Brand Finance 2013). In recent years, 
‘approximately 40 per cent of Foxconn revenues are from Apple, its 
biggest client’, a Foxconn production manager reported (Interview, 10 
March 2011). Another 20 per cent come from HP, while the remainder is 
provided by multiple customers (Interview, 21 March 2011). Foxconn’s 
heavy dependence on Apple has been a source of its rise and profit, but 
the company remains vulnerable as Apple retains the option to employ 
other contractors as well to squeeze Foxconn’s profits. Our group inter-
views with two mid- level production managers reveal that during the 
2008–09 global financial crisis, Foxconn was forced to cut prices on com-
ponents, such as connectors and printed circuit boards, and assembly, to 
retain high- volume orders. ‘Margins were cut. Still, the rock bottom line 
was kept, that is, Foxconn did not report a loss on the iPhone contract’ 
(Interviews, 10 November 2011; 19 November 2011). How did Foxconn 
manage to stay in the black while cutting its margins? By charging a 
premium on customized engineering services and quality assurance. The 
upgrading of the iPhones since 2007 has in part relied on Foxconn’s 
senior product engineers’ research analyses and constructive suggestions. 
Foxconn’s edge in technology and services served the company well in the 
crisis.
In 2009, in the wake of the global recession, the Chinese government 
froze the minimum wage across the country for one year. Foxconn accom-
modated Apple’s and other corporate buyers’ squeeze while continuing to 
reduce labour expenditures, including cuts in wages (overtime premiums) 
and benefits (productivity bonuses and quarterly prizes). Nevertheless the 
pressure was on the manufacturing company and frontline workers and 
staff.
‘Apple tightened the control over Foxconn by splitting iPhone and iPad 
orders with Taiwanese- owned Pegatron, a manufacturing unit spun off 
from Asustek, in the aftermath of the spate of worker suicides [in 2010]’ 
(Interview, 15 December 2011). By pitting its suppliers against each other, 
and investing in research, design and marketing, the American giant reaps 
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very high profits and commands a leading position in the consumer elec-
tronics market. Table 5.1 shows Apple’s revenues generated from sales of 
its branded products and services. The signature Mac computer has now 
been far surpassed by the iPhone, with the iPad following in second place.
From keyboards and mice to touch- based controls, Time magazine 
immediately recognized the iPad as one of the ’50 best inventions’ of 2010. 
A cost and profit analysis of an iPad reveals the economics and corporate 
power relations underlying Apple’s global business model. Where profit 
margins are often in the single digits in the low- end computing market, 
Apple retains 30 per cent of the sales price of the US$499 iPad, even more 
if it is sold through Apple’s retail outlets or online store. In contrast, 
labour cost for the iPad in China is estimated at only 1.6 per cent, or 
US$8 (see Figure 5.3). Although Apple does not disclose its contracts with 
Foxconn, there is no doubt that Chinese workers who assemble much of 
the iPad receive a small share of the value it generates, while Apple enjoys 
extraordinary profit margins.
The iPad has bolstered the profit margin for Apple in the worldwide 
tablet market, placing it ahead of strong competitors like Samsung. 
Incredibly, Apple (2012c) sold three million upgraded ‘new iPads’ in the 
first three days of its release in March 2012 – that is, one million iPads a 
day in the American market – making it dominant in global tablets. For 
Christmas shoppers, in December 2012 Apple introduced the fourth- 
generation iPad running on a new operating system iOS 6 (competing with 
Google’s Android application system), and the lighter and thinner 7.9- inch 
Table 5.1 Apple’s revenues by product segments, 2010–12
2011
(ended 24 September)
2012
(ended 29 September)
Millions (US$) % Millions (US$) %
iPhone 45 998 42.5 78 692 50.3
iPad 19 168 17.7 30 945 19.8
Mac 21 783 20.1 23 221 14.8
iPod 7 453 6.9 5 615 3.6
iTunes/Software/Servicesa 9 373 8.7 12 890 8.2
Accessories 4 474 4.1 5 145 3.3
Total 108 249 100 156 508 100
Note: a. Includes revenue from sales on the iTunes Store, the App Store, the Mac App 
Store, and the iBookstore, and revenue from sales of licensing and other services.
Source: Adapted from Apple’s (2012a) reclassified summary data.
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iPad mini in white and silver or black and slate. ‘Few brands are as loved 
in China as Apple’, exclaims The Economist (2012). Shoppers flocked to 
visit Apple’s three- storey store, the largest in Asia, on the Wangfujing 
shopping street in the heart of Beijing. In this era of the mobile technolo-
gies revolution, the production cycle and delivery schedules are shorter 
than ever, the pressures on workers higher.
INSIDE IPAD CITY
Foxconn Chengdu, legally registered as Hongfujin Precision Electronics 
(Chengdu) Ltd and known as iPad City, began operation in October 2010. 
All workers at this new production site are responsible for making iPads, 
serving only Apple. The factory labour force grew to 50 000 employees 
in March 2011, making it one of the city’s biggest employers in its first 
half- year of operation in the provincial capital of Sichuan, south- western 
Raw materials
31%
Non-China labor
(to manufacture
components 5%)
China labor
(for components
and assembly
1.6%)
Apple profits
30%
Distribution
and retail
15%
Suppliers profits
17.4%
Source: Adapted from Kraemer et al. (2011: 11).
Figure 5.3 Distribution of value for the iPad
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China. As of December 2012, it expanded to 165 000, and recruitment 
continued (Interview, 29 January 2013).
Andrew Ross (2006: 218) noted that in Chengdu ‘it was impossible not 
to come across evidence of the state’s hand in the fostering of high- tech 
industry’. In the years since the 7.9 magnitude earthquake struck Sichuan 
in May 2008, the provincial government has made efforts to attract 
investments to fund reconstruction. In the autumn of 2010 the officials 
subsidized the construction of the gigantic Foxconn Chengdu production 
complex and high- rise 18- storey dormitories, designating it as ‘the Number 
One Project’. Foxconn CEO Terry Gou returned the compliment, prais-
ing the government: ‘I’m very much impressed by the efficiency of local 
government departments that led to the start of the project. Foxconn 
will add investment to make the [Chengdu] factory one of Foxconn’s key 
 production sites in the world’ (quoted in Chengdu Weekly 2011).
Village, township, city and provincial- level governments in Sichuan all 
offered Foxconn free labour recruitment services. A worker commented 
(Interview, 23 March 2011), ‘Foxconn is hiring, and the whole city has 
gone crazy. Local officials grab people and ask if they’d be willing to work 
at Foxconn. The government has made it an official task. Officials at every 
level have a recruitment quota. Isn’t this recruitment crazy?’
Many workers are taking advantage of job opportunities opening up 
in or near their native place, rather than moving to distant provinces. 
Clearly the inland city of Chengdu is the new frontier for Foxconn and 
the electronics industry generally. Factory management, facing stiff 
procurement orders and tight shipment deadlines, turns again and again 
to overtime work. Posters on the Foxconn workshop walls read (our 
translation):
Value efficiency every minute, every second.
Achieve goals or the sun will no longer rise.
Execution is the integration of speed, accuracy and precision.
There is no best way, but always a better way.
The devil is in the details.
Apple and other buyers want their tablets fast to meet Chinese and 
global demand. Apple CEO Tim Cook, who succeeded the late Steve Jobs 
in August 2011, put it this way: ‘Nobody wants to buy sour milk’ (quoted 
in Satariano and Burrows 2011). And elsewhere, ‘Inventory. . .is funda-
mentally evil. You want to manage it like you’re in the dairy business: If 
it gets past its freshness date, you have a problem’ (quoted in Lashinsky 
2012: 95). Tracking demand worldwide, Apple adjusts production fore-
casts daily. Streamlining the global supply chain on the principle of market 
efficiency and ‘competition against time’ is Apple’s goal.
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Frontline workers in outsourced factories frequently pay the price. If 
a target is not fulfilled, Foxconn Chengdu workers have to stay on the 
production line to finish it, sometimes working an entire twelve- hour 
shift. Worse yet, workers frequently report that overtime is not fully docu-
mented, with the result that overtime wages are unpaid or under- paid. This 
happened when line leaders under- reported extreme (and illegal) overtime 
hours, fearing punishment by higher- ups. In another situation, workers 
were often required to work on Saturdays and Sundays during the produc-
tion peak season. While they should be paid double in accordance with 
the law, they were instead given rest days during low seasons to offset the 
overtime premiums. Grievances about pay, work stress and  unreasonable 
production demands sometimes culminated in open conflicts.
In holding Foxconn and other suppliers responsible for the problem, 
Apple ignores its own purchasing practices, such as order specification 
and sales forecasting, and the direct impact of its production deadlines on 
suppliers’ capacity to schedule working hours (Ruggie 2012).
Louis Woo, special assistant to Foxconn’s chief executive, explained 
to the journalist in an American Public Media programme (Marketplace 
2012) the kinds of pressures that Apple or Dell applies:
The overtime problem – when a company like Apple or Dell needs to ramp up 
production by 20 per cent for a new product launch, Foxconn has two choices: 
hire more workers or give the workers you already have more hours. When 
demand is very high, it’s very difficult to suddenly hire 20 per cent more people. 
Especially when you have a million workers – that would mean hiring 200 000 
people at once.
Foxconn continues to hire more workers, including teenage student 
interns in the name of skills training and business- school cooperation, and 
at the same time imposes compulsory overtime on the labour force during 
the peak production months.
SELLING LABOUR OR SELLING LIFE?
During the spring of 2011, at the still- under- construction Foxconn 
Chengdu plant, shimmering aluminium dust often filled the air. The iPad’s 
casing is aluminium, and polishing creates a large amount of dust. All 
around the factory area was not only metallic dust but also piles of sand, 
stones and soil, and the roads were uneven. The entrance to the factory 
had some crudely placed wooden boards creating a small path between 
two uneven sand piles for workers who daily passed through the makeshift 
pedestrian thoroughfare to enter the factory. Construction materials such 
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as steel bars and cement were stacked everywhere. Some factory floors 
in Zones A, B and C had already been put into production, even though 
auxiliary facilities such as toilets and canteens were not fully accessible.
In the entire month of March 2011, most production workers in 
Foxconn Chengdu logged long hours of overtime with only two rest days. 
Fan Chunyan (interviewees’ names have all been changed), a 22- year- old 
female worker, attended compulsory unpaid work meetings every day: 
‘I report to the line leaders 15 to 20 minutes earlier for roll call. Leaders 
lecture us on maintaining high productivity, reaching daily output targets 
and keeping discipline.’ On the factory floor, ‘toilet breaks during the 
working hours are also restricted. Meal times were occasionally short-
ened or even cut to finish the production quotas of the day’ (Interviews, 
18 March 2011; 20 March 2011). Machinery was never left idle. The well- 
lit factory floor was visible throughout the night from afar.
Apple, by introducing myriad changes in the design of its sophisticated 
devices, each with multiple variations to suit consumer tastes, relentlessly 
drives the pace of production with each new model and holiday season.3 
Not long after the original iPad was introduced in April 2010, Apple rein-
vented the iPad to boost sales. A company press statement dated 2 March 
2011 reads, ‘While others have been scrambling to copy the first genera-
tion iPad, we’re launching iPad 2, which moves the bar far ahead of the 
competition and will likely cause them to go back to the drawing boards 
yet again’ (Apple 2011).
‘When we have work,’ Duan Dong, a 19- year- old male worker said, 
‘half of our income is from doing overtime’ (Interview, 5 March 2011).
I didn’t go home during the Spring Festival holidays in early February [2011] 
even though my village was nearby. Instead I did 78 hours of overtime work 
that month [more than double the 36- hour legal limit for overtime under the 
Chinese Labour Law], thereby earning an additional 1090 Yuan, which added 
to my base pay of 1060 Yuan, gave me a total of 2150 Yuan [US$338].
Excessive overtime was the norm. Dong’s co- worker, Ouyang Zhong, 
married with a one- year- old daughter, had returned from home after a 
brief family reunion. That same month, he worked 44 overtime hours. 
3 Apple (2012b: 8) describes two major sources of production- time pressure, which are 
transferred to outsourced suppliers, in its annual financial report filed to the United States 
Securities and Exchange Commission: ‘The Company has historically experienced higher net 
sales in its first fiscal quarter [from September to December] compared to other quarters in 
its fiscal year due in part to holiday seasonal demand. Actual and anticipated timing of new 
product introductions by the Company can also significantly impact the level of net sales 
experienced by the Company in any particular quarter.’
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Zhong emphasized that ‘without overtime, it’s hard to get by’ (Interview, 
6 March 2011). Many workers are eager to maximize overtime as the only 
way to send home money. Others, however, are hard pressed to survive the 
long hours and intense pace but have no choice other than to accept over-
time assignments. Day and night, they toil under dangerous conditions, 
risking health and safety.
Workplace hazards monitoring, more specifically ductwork inspection 
and ventilation system review, had largely given way to meeting impossi-
bly high iPad production targets. Foxconn’s polishing workers are respon-
sible for transforming raw aluminium into shiny stainless iPad casings. 
Each polishing machine produces metallic dust as it processes and grinds 
with ever greater refinement. Microscopic aluminium dust clouds the air. 
It coats workers’ clothes. A young female polishing worker described 
the situation, ‘I’m breathing aluminium dust at Foxconn like a vacuum 
cleaner.’ The polishing workshop windows were tightly shut so that 
workers ‘felt as if we were suffocating’ (Interview, 24 March 2011). ‘Some 
tearing and pain also occur as the tiny solid aluminium particles are rinsed 
from my eyes by tears’, Ma Quan, a 20- year- old worker, explained to us 
in Sichuan dialect (Interview, 23 March 2011). He added: ‘Everyone in the 
workshop is wearing a thin gauze mask, with a centre section of activated 
charcoal, but it doesn’t have an airtight seal and provides no protection. 
Some of us are suffering from shortness of breath.’
If the masks are useless for preventing the aluminium dust’s toxic effects, 
they do help Foxconn pass factory inspections. Although workers were 
constantly coughing and complaining of a sore throat, Foxconn managers 
and Apple engineers and product development teams dispatched to the 
Chengdu factory apparently prioritized the hourly production figures.
‘Apple is committed to ensuring that working conditions in Apple’s 
supply chain are safe, that workers are treated with respect and dignity, 
and that manufacturing processes are environmentally responsible’: the 
very first commitment made by Apple (2012e: 1) in the opening line of 
its Supplier Code of Conduct rings hollow. Four colleagues of Quan had 
already quit their jobs long before their six- month probation was over. 
In the polishing workshop, workers put on cotton gloves, but the finest 
particles penetrate through the flimsy material to their hands. Workers 
simply wash their hands and bodies with soap and water, without knowing 
the exposure level of aluminium dust in their workshop. After work Quan 
took off his cotton gloves and looked helplessly at both his hands covered 
in aluminium dust. Encouraged by other workers, he relayed their shared 
health concerns to his line leader, only to hear words that left the workers 
feeling distraught (Interview, 27 March 2011): ‘The factory conditions are 
absolutely safe!’
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SPEED- UP, FIRE AND EXPLOSION
Repeated warnings from workers and labour activists about the dangers 
of aluminium dust on the eyes, lungs and skin of human beings had fallen 
on deaf ears (Students and Scholars Against Corporate Misbehaviour 
2011a, 2011b). Instead, a Foxconn media statement dated 7 May 2011 
reads:
We have made tremendous progress over the past year as we work to lead our 
industry in meeting the needs of the new generation of workers in China and 
that has been confirmed by the many customer representatives, outside experts, 
and reporters who have visited our facilities and openly met with our employees 
and our management team (quoted in IDG News 2011).
This and numerous other public relations statements, ignore the deep 
concerns of workers and make no mention of pressing grievances, demon-
strating Foxconn’s failure to conduct a comprehensive risk assessment of 
its workplace health and safety conditions, or even to recognize the need 
for such an assessment. On one point, the company statement is all too 
accurate: ‘customer representatives’, that is, Apple, visited the facilities 
and raised no significant issues concerning health and safety.
Two weeks later, on 20 May 2011, an accumulation of aluminium dust 
in the air duct on the third floor at Foxconn Chengdu Building A5, Zone 
A, provided fuel for an explosion (Duhigg and Barboza 2012). The metal-
lic dust was ignited by a spark in an electric switch. Dense smoke filled the 
workshop. ‘We barely escaped with our lives. It’s terrifying,’ the workers 
told us as they recalled the ‘black Friday evening’ (Interview, 23 May 
2011). Firemen arrived at the scene around 7:30 p.m. Ambulances and 
company vans brought male and female victims who were either seriously 
burnt or had lost consciousness to the emergency units at the Sichuan 
Chengdu People’s Hospital and other hospitals. In the midst of lightning 
and thunder that night, some workers could not hold back their tears in 
the rain.
The hectic daily work schedule was only disrupted by the Foxconn 
Chengdu aluminium- dust explosion that killed four workers and severely 
injured at least eighteen others (Apple 2012d: 15). Apple’s statement reads 
(quoted in Branigan 2011): ‘We are deeply saddened by the tragedy at 
Foxconn’s plant in Chengdu, and our hearts go out to the victims and 
their families. We are working closely with Foxconn to understand what 
caused this terrible event.’
But where, before or since, has Apple stepped in to assure that Foxconn 
take steps to protect the health and safety of workers, or accepted its own 
partial responsibility for death and injury? It was business as usual. On 
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17 December 2011, only seven months after the Foxconn Chengdu explo-
sion, combustible aluminium dust fuelled another blast, this time at a 
Shanghai- based supplier to Apple, injuring 59 workers (Apple 2012d: 15). 
In the blast, young men and women suffered severe burns and shattered 
bones, leaving many permanently disabled.
HOW DO THE CHINESE STATE AND COMPANIES 
UNDERMINE WORKERS’ RIGHTS?
Immediately after the aluminium- dust explosion at Foxconn, government 
officials and the police took control of the hospital wards. China’s State 
Council Information Office moved swiftly to curb the media. ‘In regard to 
Foxconn’s Chengdu plant explosion [on 20 May 2011], all media and web-
sites are to wait for an official report. No independent reports, re- posts, or 
recommendations will be allowed’ (China Digital Times 2011). Similarly, 
the Sichuan Provincial Propaganda Department announced: ‘With regard 
to Foxconn’s Chengdu iPad 2 plant explosion, no independent report-
ing can be conducted. Unauthorized reports will be immediately deleted’ 
(China Digital Times 2011). The blackout on the Chinese press was com-
plete. There could be no more graphic indication of the coordination 
between the party- state and the corporation at the expense of workers’ 
occupational health and lives.
The clash between worker safety and high pressure production targets 
was evident at iPad production sites. Foxconn closed the polishing 
workshops for one week to ‘cooperate with government investigation’ 
(Interview, 29 May 2011). Under mounting social pressure, Apple sent its 
Supplier Responsibility management team and ‘external experts’ to check 
‘all suppliers handling aluminium dust and put stronger precautionary 
measures in place before restarting production’, as publicly communi-
cated in its January 2012 annual report (Apple 2012d: 15). Fast- paced 
production of iPads resumed shortly. Despite the establishment of new 
safety guidelines, Apple’s ordering, pricing, and delivery demands directly 
conflict with their own supplier compliance programmes and local legal 
requirements, while maximizing profits.
Just three months after the deadly explosion, local government offi-
cials launched a large- scale recruitment campaign to support Foxconn in 
ramping up the iPad exports. Between September 2011 and January 2012, 
Foxconn Chengdu recruited more than 7000 ‘student interns’ to work on 
the assembly line, making up approximately 10 per cent of the company 
labour force (Interview, 13 December 2011). Contrary to our research 
findings, the Fair Labour Association (2013: 5), which received funding 
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from Apple for its investigation of Foxconn, ‘found no interns had been 
engaged at Chengdu since September 2011’ (our emphasis).4
Sichuan municipal and local- level governments directed full- time voca-
tional school students under their jurisdiction to perform ‘internships’ 
at labour- hungry Foxconn Chengdu factory complex. To spur schools, 
governments disbursed funds to schools that fulfilled company target 
numbers of student interns. If schools failed to meet the human resources 
requirements, education bureaux would hold up funds for the schools 
(Interview, 12 December 2011). In this way, Foxconn enlarged its labour 
recruitment networks with schools, drawing on the assistance of local gov-
ernment officials and teachers to utilize student labour, rather than hiring 
new workers.
The interns have become a huge source of cheap and disposable labour 
in China. In the summer of 2010, for example, Foxconn hired as many as 
150 000 student interns, 15 per cent of its 1 million workforce at the time 
(Foxconn Technology Group 2010). Even though interns and entry- level 
workers have the same starting wage at the company, unlike employees, 
interns enjoy none of the insurance protections regulated by local govern-
ment. Nor are they eligible for productivity bonuses, regardless of how 
well they do their jobs. They are subject to the same treatment as regular 
workers including alternating day and night shifts monthly, and extensive 
overtime, defying the letter and the spirit of the national education and 
labour laws as well as Apple’s own labour code. A 17- year- old student 
intern told us (Interview, 4 March 2011), ‘Come on, what do you think 
we’d have learned standing for more than ten hours a day manning the 
machines on the line? What’s an internship? There’s no relation to what 
we study in school. Every day is just a repetition of one or two simple 
motions, like a robot.’
Apple claims to exercise its power of ‘private governance’ to improve 
workers’ lives involved in outsourced electronics production (Locke 2013: 
6–9), which is based on the asymmetric power structure in its global supply 
chain, either on its own or in partnership with the Fair Labour Association 
and other non- governmental organizations. ‘The same leverage [of large 
4 In the absence of financial independence from companies that support it, we raise 
questions about the Fair Labour Association’s (FLA) ability to fulfil its mission to protect 
workers in the global economy. Between 2012 and 2013, the FLA received from Apple 
membership dues of US$250 000, plus ‘well into the six figures’ audit fees for conducting its 
investigation at Foxconn Chengdu (and two other Foxconn factories in Shenzhen) (Weir 
2012). The FLA ostensibly scrutinized Apple’s corporate behaviour, including its purchasing 
practices and supplier code enforcement. In practice, the systemic abuse of student workers 
at Foxconn factories in Chengdu and other cities (such as Yantai in north- eastern Shandong 
province) were not mentioned, let alone ended.
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firms] that can be used to demand lower prices and better quality from 
suppliers,’ in the analysis of Frederick Mayer and Gary Gereffi (2010: 8), 
‘can also be used to press for better labour practices.’ Foxconn workers 
and interns, however, testify that iPads are produced under unethical and 
unsafe conditions. The promises of corporate care and responsibility, 
again and again, are broken.
In a capitalist global labour regime, Garrett Brown (2010), coordina-
tor of the Maquiladora Health and Safety Support Network, emphasizes 
that the corporate social responsibility policies ‘have been fatally under-
mined by the “iron triangle” of lowest possible per- unit price, highest 
possible quality, and fastest possible delivery times.’ At the same time, the 
Chinese state, despite its strong capacity of regulating labour markets and 
workplace conditions, has colluded with capital in the race of economic 
globalization. Notwithstanding China’s significant legal reforms in recent 
decades, workers confront managerial despotism at the point of produc-
tion (Gallagher 2005; Lee 2007; 2010; Friedman and Lee 2010). Foxconn’s 
unions, even when they are largest in the industry, remain extremely 
weak. Not unlike their peers in the foreign- invested enterprises, Foxconn 
workers are not institutionally represented, while student interns are not 
even eligible for union membership. Attempts in reorganizing grassroots 
unions have been proceeding at a snail’s pace (Pringle 2013; Butollo 
and ten Brink 2012). In the face of explosive labour unrest, in Foxconn 
and beyond, the government has been compelled to accommodate some 
worker demands in the interests of securing a measure of social stability 
(Lee and Zhang 2013; Lee and Hsing 2010; Selden and Perry 2010). But 
worker grievances and collective resistance are widespread.
CONCLUSIONS
‘Taiwan’s history of economic growth is also a history of technological 
catastrophes.’ Thus Hsin- Hsing Chen (2011: 563) highlights the suffering 
of 1395 former workers of RCA (Radio Corporation of America), who 
were poisoned by trichloroethylene at the workplace and diagnosed with 
cancer. In response, RCA shut down the Taoyuan factory and migrated 
elsewhere, without compensating the terminally ill. This worker tragedy 
is not an isolated example. With American, Taiwanese and international 
capital entering China, workers are similarly subject to life- threatening 
risks of globalized electronics production.
Apple, together with other firms, has created a global consumer class 
with its products and through Foxconn and other subcontractors it has 
simultaneously contributed to the creation of a new Chinese working class. 
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Foxconn, given its corporate power and intricate ties with the Chinese 
government at all levels, has manufactured not only signature electronic 
goods for global brands, but also occupational injuries and deaths, while 
refusing to accept even minimal responsibility. Chinese workers, through 
popular writings on micro- blogs, open letters, videos, poems and songs, 
as well as in growing numbers of walkouts, strikes, riots, sit- ins, and legal 
protests, unveil the harsh reality behind the mainstream discourse of ‘cor-
porate ethics’ and ‘social harmony’. The following lyrics convey the sense 
of the heavy human cost behind transnational manufacturing.
A Worker’s Requiem
My body stretches long
lying within a bare building
obstructing the cityscape,
sealed tightly in cement
burying my story
With each mouthful of toxic dust inhaled
profit is exhaled
following prices’ rise and fall
each annual fireworks squander
burning my breath
Back bent I furtively twitter
computers nibble away life
backpack heavy on shoulder
muscles and bones strained to the limit
concealing my hardship
My body conveys a message:
reject this false prosperity
leave the corner of darkness—
strained body and soul embrace each other
still you and I will not yield
Teardrops accumulate,
collecting sediments of months and years of weight
of course, dreams are repeatedly shattered
but spirits always sing in the wind
of a worker’s story.
Mininoise, Hong Kong grassroots folk band
(Translated by Gregory Fay and Kyoko Selden)
In the course of our ongoing research and support work, some Foxconn 
workers have joined hands with students, scholars and independent 
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labour rights groups to pressurize brands to respond to their demands. 
An important goal is to ‘create a sense of moral accountability’ to urge 
the target corporations (Seidman 2007: 32), in this instance particularly 
both Apple and Foxconn, to live up to their professed global corporate 
citizenship ideals. In the tightly integrated production supply base, such 
as China, ‘the potential geographical ramifications of disruptions’ can be 
extensive (Silver 2003: 6). The new international division of labour and the 
growing realization of worker precarity creates ‘opportunities for counter- 
organization’, as attested by the rise of transnational labour movements 
and anti- sweatshop campaigns (Evans 2010: 352; Webster et al. 2008).
The young cohort of Chinese workers are calling for dignified treat-
ment and economic justice. The form of labour resistance will change as 
workers find employment closer to their native place and can draw on 
local social networks. With new factory operations in booming inland 
cities, a substantial proportion of rural workers are being recruited from 
within their home province and even their home prefecture or town. 
Foxconn, with its large- scale operations in China’s west, well exemplifies 
the trend. With a greater sense of entitlement associated with belonging to 
a place, and perhaps more social resources to bring to the fight for their 
interests, working- class power could emerge in factories and in worker 
communities.
